Razones insuficientes: la pérdida del agente en la interpretación racional y la teoría causal de la acción
The paper exposes two explanatory proposals to the problem of action in analytic philosophy: the rational or normativist explanation and the Davidsonian causal theory of action. The problem of the disappearing agent in both proposals will be highlighted, showing how ultimately psychological and phys...
Guardado en:
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| Formato: | Online |
| Lenguaje: | spa |
| Publicado: |
Facultad de Filosofía y Letras, Universidad Nacional de Cuyo
2022
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| Acceso en línea: | https://revistas.uncu.edu.ar/ojs3/index.php/philosophia/article/view/6605 |
| Sumario: | The paper exposes two explanatory proposals to the problem of action in analytic philosophy: the rational or normativist explanation and the Davidsonian causal theory of action. The problem of the disappearing agent in both proposals will be highlighted, showing how ultimately psychological and physiological events take place within a person, but the person serves only as a setting for these events. We will finish with the exposition of a possible way of solution, substantial agent causality, which makes action intelligible and allows the integration of reasons and physical causality within the agent. |
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