Suárez y la primera certeza del sentido común

The first certainty of common sense originally proves a multiplicity of things irreducible to each other. The unity of the ens is not an original empirical datum, but a derived concept, precisely because it is common to many things. From this point of view, it is necessary to distinguish between the...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autor principal: Renzi, Fabrizio
Formato: Online
Lenguaje:spa
Publicado: Facultad de Filosofía y Letras, Universidad Nacional de Cuyo 2020
Materias:
ens
Acceso en línea:https://revistas.uncu.edu.ar/ojs3/index.php/philosophia/article/view/4421
Descripción
Sumario:The first certainty of common sense originally proves a multiplicity of things irreducible to each other. The unity of the ens is not an original empirical datum, but a derived concept, precisely because it is common to many things. From this point of view, it is necessary to distinguish between the Suarezian philosophy and the Parmenidean philosophy. In particular, the way that the question concerning the dialectical opposition between being and nothing is approached in the Metaphysical Disputations cannot be interpreted as the manifestation of a Parmenidean position. The starting point of the Suarezian reflection is the plurality of the entities.